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Abstract
We study the effect of product prominence in consumer search on demand and
equilibrium prices using data from Danish pharmaceutical markets. Variation in promi-
nence comes from alphabetical ordering in physician IT-systems. We find that both
prescriptions, prices, market shares and revenue decrease in alphabetical rank. We esti-
mate a structural ordered search model which confirms that physicians actively search.
They react to patient expenditures, albeit less than patients, and increase search effort
for low-income and female patients. Sorting products by price would reduce equi-
librium expenditures by 5%, which is more than a removal of search frictions would
achieve.
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1 Introduction
In the supermarket or on internet search engines, some products are easier to find than
others. This can be a source of market power for prominent firms, because it reduces the
cost of considering their products relative to competing ones. Since at least Stigler (1961)
and Nelson (1970), economists have acknowledged the role of consumer information fric-
tions for market power, firm conduct, and price dispersion (Varian, 1980). Theoretically,
prominence has been shown to be an advantage which ran result in either higher prices
(Arbatskaya, 2007) or lower prices (Armstrong et al., 2009) depending on preferences and
search costs.
We study the effect of product prominence on equilibrium prices and market shares
using a dataset covering all transactions and prices in Danish pharmacies between 2005
and 2016. Prominence arises because prescribing physicians in Denmark use a search
engine to find drugs which presents results in alphabetical order. This generates arbitrary
variation in brand prominence for physicians across products, which we use to estimate its
effect on prescription shares, market shares, and prices.
Our setting allows us to overcome two concerns that typically complicate the study of
prominence in market settings: first, positioning is often either a choice or a product itself
and thus an endogenous outcome (as in e.g. Jerath et al., 2011; McDevitt, 2014). Second, in
experiments where prominence is randomized among consumers, one can study the causal
effect of prominence on demand (Agarwal et al., 2011; Blake et al., 2015; Ursu, 2018),
but not the effect on prices because firms set the same prices for the treatment and control
groups. In our setting alphabetical rank varies both across markets and over time so we can
assume that the measured effects take into account adjustment of equilibrium prices and
beliefs.
We find that alphabetical rank is important in determining which drug physicians put on
the prescription. In our preferred regression specification with product-level fixed effects,
the prescription share decreases 4.9%-points per alphabetical rank in duopoly markets. This
passes through to consumer purchase so that market share decreases 2.4%-points in alpha-
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betical rank, and prices decrease 4.7% per rank in duopoly markets. In more competitive
markets, the effects are numerically smaller but still negative. Note that by including prod-
uct fixed effects, our results are robust to any time-constant firm-level unobservables that
might be correlated with name choice.1 While the reduced form results tell us the causal
effect of prominence on prices under the given information structure, we use a model to
quantify the relative importance of preferences and information frictions for physicians and
patients, and consider counterfactual search architectures.
We build a structural econometric model of physician prescription and consumer pur-
chase. The physician exerts costly effort to browse through the list of available brands,
trading off search costs against expected savings to the consumer. The consumer takes the
prescription to the pharmacy and conducts ordered search under the guidance of the phar-
macist who is mandated to recommend the cheapest available product (a process called
generic substitution) and influenced by the brand on the prescription. This makes the pre-
scribed and the cheapest products particularly cheap to inspect and thus prominent to the
consumer.
Estimation is made tractable due to recent methodological breakthroughs in estimation
of ordered search models. Armstrong (2017) and Choi et al. (2018a) have independently
shown how to recast “Pandora’s Rule” for optimal search (due to Weitzman, 1979) as a
static discrete choice problem. However, the discrete choice utilities are latent variables
that require integration. Moraga-Gonzalez et al. (2018) overcome this with an equivalent
specification whereby choice probabilities are available in closed form and integration can
be done in a single step after estimation is completed. This significantly reduces the com-
putational cost of estimating the model.
The estimated model shows that the physician is not ignorant about the induced effect
on the consumer, but neither is she a perfect search agent. We find that physicians search
more for females and for poor consumers. We interpret the latter as evidence that physicians
have social preferences across consumers consistent with redistribution. On the other hand,
1Institutionally, firms are moreover greatly limited in their ability to change name, which we discuss in
Section 2.1.
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the physician responds less to variation in consumer expenditures than the consumer does,
with a physician coefficient on log expenditure of -0.67 compared to the patient’s own
coefficient of -1.32.
We use the model to investigate the counterfactual effects of either removing search
frictions for the physician or implementing an alternative search architecture. We conduct
these experiments both for frozen prices and solving numerically for the counterfactual
mixed strategy price equilibrium. Reassuringly, we find that the equilibrium in the baseline
produces decreasing prices in rank, consistent with what we observe in the data.
For frozen prices, a removal of physician search frictions only reduces expenditures
by 0.1% in duopoly markets. Allowing firms to adjust their prices and solving for the
counterfactual equilibrium, we find that expenditures fall by 1.7%. This is mostly driven
by prominent firms lowering their prices in response to their lost market power, but partly
by a slight price increase by the firms furthest down the list.
Conversely, when we rank products in the physician IT system based on price we find
a uniform decrease in prices across all rank positions and a 5.2% reduction in expendi-
tures. In duopolies, the first firm’s price drops by 6.1% and the second firm’s by 3.5%. In
contrast, prices dropped by 2.6% and 0.9% for free search. This is because the inelastic de-
mand segment caused by prescriptions is now directed towards the cheapest product. This
removes the previous incentive for prominent firms to raise prices to exploit their inelastic
customers and instead focus on participating in the competition to be cheapest. In this way,
we have shown that the information frictions can be harnessed in the design of the search
architecture to improve competition and market outcomes.
We conduct two further counterfactuals to provide a frame of reference for the magni-
tudes. We show that simply prohibiting physicians from writing prescriptions to original
manufacturers would reduce costs by 3.2%. This demonstrates the important role of pre-
scriptions in explaining the demand for the typically high-priced branded drugs post patent
expiration which was highlighted e.g. by Feng (2019). Second, we conduct a counterfactual
experiment in which the physician is forced to always prescribe the cheapest product, thus
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fully removing the physician margin of choice. In duopoly markets, this reduces costs of
10.3%. This represents an upper bound to what can be achieved by affecting prescriptions
but is not itself a realistic policy as the physician may have medical reasons for preferring
one generic to another for a specific consumer.
We contribute to a growing recent literature on the importance of brands and prescrip-
tions in pharmaceutical markets. Previous work has shown that information frictions are an
important determinant of patient choice: for instance, expert and novice consumers differ
in their propensity to buy generics (Bronnenberg et al., 2015; Janssen, 2019) and the effect
of prescriptions on demand has been documented in a randomized experiment where the
physician by default would prescribe the cheapest (with the possibility of an opt-out), find-
ing a 5.4% increase in generic consumption, Patel et al. (2014). Our contribution to this
literature is to document the effect of this prescription decision on equilibrium prices.
Our paper also contributes to a literature studying how search frictions affect prices em-
pirically. We study a centralized market, whereas the previous literature has largely focused
on decentralized markets with studies of such as mutual fund fees (Hortaçsu and Syverson,
2004), credit card interest rates (Galenianos and Gavazza, 2018), mortgage prices (Allen
et al., 2019), and used book prices (Ellison and Ellison, 2018). In decentralized markets,
search frictions keep buyers from meeting individual sellers, which affords a form of local
monopoly power. In our case, consumers are unaware of the full choiceset but all con-
sumers pay the same price on the same date for a given product.
We also contribute to an empirical literature investigating the importance of choice ar-
chitecture for consumer choices. For retirement-savings decisions, status quo bias (Samuel-
son and Zeckhauser, 1988) has been used to explain sub-optimal decisions (Madrian and
Shea, 2001; Beshears et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2011). For health insurance plan choice,
Abaluck and Gruber (2011) documented choice inconsistencies among the elderly. Abaluck
and Gruber (2016) argue that consumers make worse decisions in when presented with a
larger choiceset. Our model has a similar implication for fixed prices, but we present evi-
dence that firms exploit these information frictions by charging higher prices, and we argue
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that this competitive channel is first-order.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the
institutional setting. Section 3 presents descriptive evidence and Section 4 empirical results.
In Section 5 and Section 6 we present the structural model and counterfactual simulations
and the final section concludes.
2 Data and Institutional Setting
2.1 Institutional Setting
Denmark has a universal single-payer healthcare system which also subsidizes prescription
drugs. To contain costs, the government therefore regulates both the supply and demand
side which we will describe in turn.
Prices are set in a centralized platform in a mechanism akin to a first price position auc-
tion. Every 14 days, firms simultaneously submit prices to the Danish Medicines Agency
(DMA) for all their products. Each drug competes with other drugs that belong to the
same “substitution group” (which will also be our definition of a market) which is a group
of drugs having the same substance, strength, dose and similar2 pack size as measured in
number of Defined Daily Dosages (DDDs). All products that have a submitted price in the
system are available for the consumer to purchase at that price, but the cheapest product
(the winner) receives a prominent position in the market because pharmacists are mandated
to recommend that consumers switch to this product. It is technically legal to buy and sell
prescription drugs outside this system, but since the government subsidy will not apply in
that case, no pharmacies do this.
The demand side is influenced by both final consumers, who purchase and pay for the
medicine, physicians that write prescriptions, and pharmacists who recommend the cheap-
est product. Consumers contact their physician to obtain a prescription which gives them
2The definition of a substitution group allows for a variation of ±10% in the quantity (measured by DDD)
within the group.
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right to purchase pharmaceuticals from a specific substitution group. When consulting the
patient, the physician must choose one of the available products in the substitution group; it
is not possible for the physician to specify that she has no preference for one firm’s generic
over another in the substitution group. Physicians make this choice in an IT system, which
transfers the prescription electronically to the pharmacy. There is no monetary incentive
involved when physicians write prescriptions.
The alphabetical ranking of brands is important because of the design of the search
tool in the physicians’ IT system. When physicians types in a query, e.g. “Omeprazole”,
packages with a name matching the search term are presented in alphabetical order by
the name of the package, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. To get the price information, the
physicians click on the product, and the information is presented in a box below.
Figure 2.1: Search engine illustration
(a) Example 1: Omeprazole (b) Example 2: Pantroprazole
The ability of firms to change name for their products is limited by regulation. Under
Danish law, pharmaceutical product names can take one of two forms: 1) A special name
which is to be approved by the government, and must comply with a number of rules (It
must be different from all other international non-proprietary names for instance, must be
pronounceable etc.). 2) a Danish or international non-proprietary drug name (e.g. peni-
cillin) followed by the company name, i.e. Molecule (“Firm A”). Typically, the original
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manufacturer will fall into category 1, while most generics fall into category 2. We restrict
attention to generics of this naming form and will focus on markets where a maximum of
two products have names of a different form. This ensures that in the markets we study, the
order of the generic firms in the search rank is determined by the company name, and the
branded product will appear either before or after the block of generic products depending
on the alphabetical ranking of the proprietary and non-proprietary names of the molecule.3
The pharmacist’s role in the mechanism is to guide demand towards the cheapest prod-
uct in the market, which they are legally mandated to. This is referred to as generic sub-
stitution and appears in most countries in some variation.4 Pharmacist margins on pre-
scriptions are dictated by the government and do not depend on consumer choice. The
logistics of transporting products to pharmacies is carried out by a fully regulated state-
mandated duopoly that is independent of the pharmacies. Pharmacies are required to stock
the winning product, and can typically obtain any product within a few days. The phar-
macy industry as a whole is heavily regulated with respect to entry and ownership structure
(they must be owned by a pharmacologist, which for instance bars supermarket chains from
entering the market).5
In the end, the consumer makes the final choice and pays for the product. The con-
sumer receives a fraction of the cheapest price in subsidy. This fraction increases in annual
expenditure, starting at 0% and eventually reaching 100% for consumers with very high
accumulated expenditures (see Appendix Figure A.1). However, a consumer must pay
the full price difference between the cheapest product and the chosen product out of own
pocket. This structure of insurance implies that the consumer receives a fixed subsidy re-
gardless of which product gets chosen and then pays the prices. This allows us to simplify
3For example, ATC N03AX09 has proprietary name Lamictal and non-proprietary name Lamotrigin,
whereas ATC C10AA01 has names Zocor and Simvastatin. For those two markets, the branded firm thus
comes before (N03AX09) and after (C10AA01) generics, respectively.
4If multiple firms bid the lowest price, the pharmacist may choose which to recommend.
5From a political economy perspective, the current pharmacies have an incentive to comply with govern-
ment regulation by for instance handing out the cheapest products in order to avoid a negative political focus
on the pharmacy industry. In this way, pharmacies reduce the incentive for politicians to reform and liberalize
the sector.
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the structural model and abstract from insurance.
2.2 Data
Our dataset is merged from a number of sources. Most importantly, we rely on the universe
of all transactions of prescription drugs in Danish pharmacies in the period 2005–2016.
Each row in that dataset contains an identifier for the purchasing consumer, the prescribing
physician, and product identifiers for the purchased and prescribed product (which may
be different). In addition, each row contains product and consumer information such as
the price, pack size, form and the subsidy received. We augment this dataset with all
prices from an online source maintained by the Danish Medicines Agency (DMA) who
runs pharmaceutical auctions. This gives us information on available products that didn’t
sell in a two-week period and thus did not appear as a transaction. We construct patent
expiration dates by combining data on special European patent extension dates (SPCs) from
the Danish Patent and Trademark Office with data on molecule marketing approval dates
from the DMA. We merge this data with consumer demographics (age, income, gender
and education) from Danish population registers. We do not observe whether a product
is generic or branded directly. Instead, we define a product as generic if it has quotation
marks in its name, which indicates that a product belongs to naming category 2 as described
above. We also run robustness checks with a broader definition, where we define a generic
as a product that was not present before patent expiration in a market where we observed
at least one such.
2.2.1 Sample selection
We will now briefly cover our sample selection criteria and refer to Appendix Table A.1
for further details. We focus on all price-periods after April 1st 2005, where a reform
drastically changed the pricing system (see Kaiser et al., 2014), and our last period of data
is the final two weeks of 2016.
We only keep product-periods that satisfy the following criteria: minimum one year
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after patent expiration; at least one generic product present; product name (in the IT system)
must be observed; and between two and eight firms active. The last constraint removes
monopoly markets and a small number of markets with a large number of firms. This results
in a dataset with 348,494 product-period observations, covering 99,4 million transactions,
which we will use to study of the effect of prominence on prescription shares, prices, market
shares, and revenue.
From this set of potential product-periods, we choose a further subsample to be used
in our structural model of physician and consumer choice. There, we restrict to the period
before 2014 where we have data on consumer demographics. Finally, we drop a small
number of transactions (0.1%) where a the purchasing consumer could not be matched to
the demographic registers. This leads to 60.0 million transaction conducted from 172,502
product-periods. We base our choice estimation on a random 1% subsample of this.
3 Descriptive evidence
Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between the alphabetical rank of a product on the x-axis
and the average or median of four different outcome variables on the y-axis, and as such
display the raw associations in the data to provide an overview.
The reason why the alphabetical rank of a product matters to market outcomes is that
it affects physician prescriptions. We illustrate the relation between prescriptions and al-
phabetic rank in Figure 3.1a. The graph shows that the earlier in the alphabet a firm is, the
more prescriptions it obtains. Furthermore, the effect flattens out from rank 4 and onwards,
indicating that the effect of rank is most important for the first couple of clicks down the
list in the IT system. One thing stands out: the last product has a markedly higher average
prescription share than the second to last. This is because the original manufacturer either
comes first or last in a substitution group due to the naming conventions described in Sec-
tion 2. Appendix Figure A.3 shows the frequency with which a given product is a generic
depending on rank.
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Figure 3.1: Alphabetical Rank and Market Outcomes
(a) Prescription share
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Av
g.
 P
re
sc
rip
tio
n 
Sh
ar
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Alphabetical Rank
2 Firms 3 Firms 4 Firms 5 Firms
6 Firms 7 Firms 8 Firms
(b) Market share
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Av
g.
 M
ar
ke
t S
ha
re
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Alphabetical Rank
2 Firms 3 Firms 4 Firms 5 Firms
6 Firms 7 Firms 8 Firms
(c) Revenue
11
11
.5
12
12
.5
13
13
.5
M
ed
ia
n 
Lo
g(
R
ev
en
ue
+1
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Alphabetical Rank
2 Firms 3 Firms 4 Firms 5 Firms
6 Firms 7 Firms 8 Firms
(d) Price
4
4.
5
5
5.
5
Av
g.
 L
og
(P
ric
e)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Alphabetical Rank
2 Firms 3 Firms 4 Firms 5 Firms
6 Firms 7 Firms 8 Firms
Note: All figures are constructed using our product-level dataset (i.e. an observation is a product-period)
including all products both branded and generic. Since 5 % of observations have zero revenue we add 1 to
revenue before taking logs and plot the median value by rank.
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Figures 3.1b and 3.1c show that both market share and revenue are declining in alpha-
betical rank, although as one might expect, the relationship is less stark. This shows that
being prominent appears to be an advantage to firms.
Figure 3.1d shows the average log unit price by the alphabetical rank of the firm. The
relation between price and alphabetical rank appears to depend on market structure. For
markets with two, three, and four firms the slope is negative, but in less concentrated mar-
kets the price-rank gradient flattens.
Next, we turn to the shape of the demand curve, describing how patient purchase de-
pends on price. Figure 3.2 shows on the x axis the price relative to the winning price in
the market, and on the y axis the average market share within bins. When the relative price
is 1, it means that the product had the cheapest price in the market during that period, and
on average such products received about 55% market share. For the product-periods with a
price just a tiny bit above the minimum price, the market share was instead just under 30%.
This sharp discontinuity at the minimum price is due to generic substitution, whereby the
pharmacist is mandated to recommend that the consumer buy the cheapest available prod-
uct. This discontinuity in demand eliminates pure strategy equilibria, since firms have a
strong incentive to undercut. However, Figure 3.2 also shows that a non-negligible market
share accrues to products with very high prices: products with prices more than 100% over
the minimum price managed to still attract a 10% market share on average. These two
features together – a discontinuity at the bottom, but a non-zero market share at high prices
– make the demand side reminiscent of the “shoppers and loyals” model of Varian (1980).
It is important to note that the figures above are comparisons of raw means and thus,
at this point, merely reflect associations. We address endogeneity issues in Section 4 using
fixed effects regressions.
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Figure 3.2: Demand discontinuity at the minimum price
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Note: The figure shows binned averages of the market share of products plotted against the price relative
to the cheapest product on the x-axis. For example, an x-value of 1.0 indicates that the product was the
cheapest, whereas a value of 2.0 indicates a price 100% higher than the minimum price. An observation is a
product-period. Note that because the plot includes products across markets with different numbers of firms,
and because firms sometimes tie at the cheapest, we should not expect the plot to integrate to one.
4 Regression Results
In this section, we estimate the effect of alphabetical rank on prescription share, price,
market share and revenue share using fixed effects regressions. The unit of observation is
a product, j, in a two-week period, t. As described in Section 2, our sample is restricted
to observations after 2005 for off-patent markets where at least 2 firms but no more than 8
firms were present. Our primary sample has 697,630 observations of product-periods. In
all specifications we cluster standard errors at the market level (substitution group). In our
preferred specification, this results in 1552 clusters. We present summary statistics for our
main regressions sample in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
mean sd p10 p50 p90
No. firms 4.19 1.77 2.00 4.00 7.00
No. generic def 1 2.23 2.07 0.00 2.00 5.00
No. generic def 2 3.22 1.84 1.00 3.00 6.00
log(revenue) 5.97 1.34 4.66 5.59 7.84
log(price ) 1.19 1.54 -0.46 0.92 3.12
Years since patent exclusivity 10.83 8.93 2.31 8.17 23.21
N 697,636
4.1 Econometric Specification and Identification
We will present results for four different outcomes, collectively labelled y jt : the logarithm
of the unit price, the prescription share, the market share, and the revenue share.6 We
consider variations of the following regression model:
y jt = ρ1R jt +ρ2R jt × Jm jt +
8
∑
k=3
δk1(Jmt = k)+x jtβ +η jt + ε jt , (4.1)
where m j is the market to which product j belongs, Jm jt is the number of products avail-
able in the market in period t (so δk are dummies for the number of active firms), R jt ∈
{1, ...,Jm jt} is the alphabetical rank , x jt is a vector of controls, which includes dummies
for the number of years since patent expiration. Lastly η jt is short-hand for time and/or
product fixed effects. We use different specifications for η jt to use different sources of
identifying variation. We allow the effect of rank R jt to depend on the level of competition
by including the interaction between rank and number of firms in the market, so the effect
of rank is composed of the linear effects, ρ1,ρ2. In the following, we discuss identification
under various specifications of η jt .
We use fixed effects to address the possibility that firms early in the alphabet are fun-
damentally different from firms late in the alphabet, something that would bias pooled
estimates. Our main concerns are 1) that some firms may game the system by strategically
6The revenue share is defined as the revenue (price times quantity) for product j out of total revenue
earned by all firms in the same market and period.
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choosing a name that is early in the alphabet and 2) that entry may be endogenous to alpha-
betic rank and demand factors. We address the first concern by including firm fixed effects
f j (of which there are 72), in all specifications. This means that if one firm always ranks
first whenever it is active, its outcomes will not provide variation the contributes in identi-
fying ρ1,ρ2. It will, however, affect the rank of other firms, since it may push competitors
further down the list when it enters. In some specifications, we also include market fixed
effects, which for example absorbs time constant market-specific demand factors, such as
the therapeutic area of the drug or the cost of production.
To address potential differences between products early and late in the alphabet we
further estimate a specification where we use product fixed effects, η j. The product fixed
effect is identical to a fixed effect for each firm-market pair, since products do not change
owning firms in our setting.7 Therefore, the product fixed effect would in particular absorb
any firm or market fixed effects. Moreover, it captures any differences in product charac-
teristics that might exist between (bioequivalent) drugs in a market: color of the coating,
shape of the pills or brand perception. In this specification, the variation in alphabetical
rank comes from entry or exit of competitors with names positioned earlier in the alphabet.
In one market, a competitor may enter that does not affect the rank of firm j (if the entrant
is later in the alphabet), whereas another firm may enter that overtakes firm j, reducing its
rank. In this way we get separate identification of the alphabetical rank and the number
of firms conditional on η j. Finally, this specification is robust to entry on time-constant
unobservables since this is essentially an effect where specific firms (e.g. last in the alpha-
betical list) only tend to enter specific markets (e.g. ones that have particularly inelastic
consumers).
Lastly, we implement a specification that addresses entry on time-varying market unob-
servables by onsidering a specification with market-by-date fixed effects, complemented by
firm ( f j) fixed effects, by setting η jt = ηm jt +η f j . Here, there is only variation in alphabeti-
cal rank within a market across the different products, so the identifying variation for ρ1,ρ2
7If one generic firm acquire’s the legal right to sell a product from another firm, it would result in a new
product ID and the name of the package would have the new owner’s firm name.
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is instead based on a direct comparison between products of different ranks. Most impor-
tantly, this specification controls for time-varying market-specific unobservables. Imagine
for example that high-ranking firms are only active when demand is extremely high, and
that this high demand causes prices to increase in general (creating endogeneity). That
effect would be captured by ηm jt .
4.2 Results
We present results for the four outcome variables of interest. In all specifications, the
marginal effect of rank under a given market structure is computed as the sum of the direct
effect (ρ1) and interaction effect with number of products, ρ1 + ρ2 × J. To avoid evalu-
ating this expression, Table 4.2 summarizes all the following tables, showing the results
from our preferred specification with product-level fixed effects for all four outcomes. We
see that all four outcomes are decreasing in alphabetical rank, but that the slope becomes
numerically smaller when more firms are present in the market. In the following, we will
go through each outcome separately and compare results across specifications of η jt and
discuss statistical significance.
Table 4.2: Marginal Rank Effects and Market Structure
log(pt) Prescription Share Market Share Revenue Share
J = 0 -.063 -.061 -.027 -.023
J = 2 -.047 -.049 -.024 -.020
J = 3 -.040 -.043 -.023 -.018
J = 4 -.032 -.037 -.021 -.017
J = 5 -.024 -.031 -.020 -.015
J = 6 -.017 -.026 -.019 -.014
J = 7 -.0089 -.020 -.017 -.012
J = 8 -.0011 -.014 -.015 -.010
Note: The table shows the effect of alphabetical rank on each respective outcome variable for dif-
ferent levels of competition measured as the number of available products (J). The effects are com-
puted as ρ̂1+ ρ̂2Jm jt . The marginal effects are computed using our preferred regression specification
with fixed effects at the product and period level, η jt = η j +ηt .
Table 4.3 shows results for the effect of alphabetical rank on the share of prescriptions in
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a market accruing to a specific product. Across specifications we find a strong significant
negative effect ranging between -0.061%-points with product fixed effects and -0.059%-
points with market-by-date fixed effects. Since it is the prescribing physician that browses
through products in alphabetical order on the computer screen, there would be no reason
to expect an effect on consumer choice or pricing, were the physician’s choice not affected
by the product rank.
Table 4.3: Prescription share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0319∗∗ -0.0538∗∗∗ -0.0564∗∗∗ -0.0607∗∗∗ -0.0587∗∗∗
(0.00995) (0.00731) (0.00797) (0.00669) (0.00843)
Rank×No. Firms 0.00111 0.00516∗∗∗ 0.00558∗∗∗ 0.00591∗∗∗ 0.00605∗∗∗
(0.00151) (0.00106) (0.00114) (0.000790) (0.00122)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 1552 1552 1547 1540 1475
Observations 697636 697635 697630 697511 685368
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
As shown in Table 4.2, the marginal effect of rank on prescriptions is significantly
negative for all levels of competition, starting at -.049 with 2 firms to -.014 with 8 firms.
The next set of results investigates to what extent a prescription gets converted into
purchase in the Danish system. Table 4.4 presents results for regressions of market share on
alphabetical rank. Again we find a significant and negative main effect ranging between -
0.027%-points with product-level fixed effects and -0.022%-points in the specification with
only company and period fixed effects. These results document that the physician’s choice
of product from the drop-down list passes through to the consumer’s purchase decision. A
patient is more likely to buy a product simply because it is on the prescription. In Table 4.2,
we see that the marginal effect of rank on market share is always negative, ranging from
-.024 with 2 firms to -0.16 with 8 firms.
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It is important to note that because firms can adjust their prices in response to increased
demand, the estimated effect that we present of prominence on both physician and patient
choice are after equilibrium adjustment. If prominent firms increase their prices, as we
shall shortly see that they do in most markets, the price response will to some extent off-
set the effect of prominence on market share. Therefore, we should expect to estimate a
numerically smaller effect of prominence, than what we would see if we could hold prices
fixed. For policy purposes, an effect after equilibrium adjustment is most relevant, since it
is rarely the case that firms are unable to adjust their prices in response to a policy.
Table 4.4: Market share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0223∗∗∗ -0.0379∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0274∗∗∗ -0.0223∗∗∗
(0.00641) (0.00581) (0.00633) (0.00553) (0.00675)
Rank×No. Firms 0.00222∗ 0.00387∗∗∗ 0.00240∗∗ 0.00149∗ 0.00209∗
(0.000982) (0.000865) (0.000922) (0.000717) (0.000985)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 1552 1552 1547 1540 1475
Observations 697636 697635 697630 697511 685368
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.5 shows how prices are affected by prominence. Qualitatively, all specifications
robustly show the same result: prices are generally downward sloping in rank, but the slope
flattens with more firms. In the specification with product-level fixed effects, the price-rank
gradient is zero when more than 8 firms are present. This is consistent with what we saw in
the raw averages in Figure 3.1d. The quantitative magnitudes of the pooled OLS results are
very large, consistent with the raw averages, but as soon as we add company and market
fixed effects, the magnitudes fall to much more plausible levels in the range of 4.5%–6.3%
per rank, diminishing by 0.5-0.7%-point per extra firm active. As Table 4.2 showed, the
marginal effect of rank starts at 4.7% for duopoly markets, and is 0.1% with 8 firms.
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Table 4.5: Log price regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.592∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ -0.0444∗∗ -0.0629∗∗∗ -0.0506∗∗
(0.0609) (0.0498) (0.0159) (0.0168) (0.0166)
Rank×No. Firms 0.0723∗∗∗ 0.0425∗∗∗ 0.00556 0.00772∗∗∗ 0.00772∗
(0.00969) (0.00796) (0.00288) (0.00202) (0.00305)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 1552 1552 1547 1540 1475
Observations 697636 697635 697630 697511 685368
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Since market shares are decreasing in alphabetical rank and prices are either decreasing
or mostly flat, it is perhaps not surprising that the firm’s revenue as a fraction of total market
revenue is also decreasing in alphabetical rank, as shown in Table 4.6. The pattern similar to
the one in Table 4.4 where market share is the outcome. Revenue share decreases between
2.2%-point in alphabetical position in the specification with product-level fixed effects and
4.4%-point in the specification with company fixed effects only. Hence, in equilibrium it
is a profitable advantage for firms to be ranked early in the alphabet. The reason why we
prefer to use revenue share and not log revenue is the high prevalence of zero sales in our
data. As a robustness, Table A.2 in the appendix presents regressions using log revenue as
outcome, and they show a similar pattern.
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Table 4.6: Revenue share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0206∗∗∗ -0.0339∗∗∗ -0.0270∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0263∗∗∗
(0.00623) (0.00577) (0.00640) (0.00531) (0.00683)
Rank×No. Firms 0.00188 0.00346∗∗∗ 0.00272∗∗ 0.00156∗ 0.00261∗
(0.000982) (0.000884) (0.000958) (0.000740) (0.00102)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 1552 1552 1547 1540 1475
Observations 697636 697635 697630 697511 685368
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Here, we use all products regardless of whether they are generic og branded.
In general, all the results presented above have been on the full sample of products.
In spite of the fact that we use product fixed effects, one might still wonder if branded
and generic products are too dissimilar to compare. Therefore, as a robustness we also
run the same regressions on the sample consisting exclusively of generics according to
either a wide or a narrow definition of generics. The wide definition results in 348,491
product-period observations over 711 markets, and the results are presented in Appendix
Sections A.2 and A.3 respectively. The qualitative picture is the same and all estimates are
statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
5 Model
In this section we outline a structural model of physician and consumer brand choice and
generic substitution in the Danish market for pharmaceuticals. We consider choices by two
decision makers: Physicians search in their IT system for a product to prescribe and con-
sumers search in the pharmacy for a product to purchase. Our exposition is an adaptation
of the empirical approach developed by Moraga-Gonzalez et al. (2018).
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5.1 The Physician’s Choice
5.1.1 Physician objective function
Physicians choose which product, indexed by j, to prescribe to consumer i by maximizing
utility
ui j = ωi j(p)+ εi j, εi j ∼ F
ε(·),
where εi j represents an unobserved utility component, and ωi j(p) is a deterministic utility
function, measuring how physicians think prices affect consumer welfare, which we will
detail below. Both εi j and p – and therefore ωi j(p) – are unknown to physicians but can be
learned by searching product j at the random search cost ci j ∼ Fc(x; µi j), with µi j being
a location parameter. A market consist of J products that can be bought with the same
prescription, meaning that all J products contain identical active substance in the same
quantity (they are bioequivalent) but may have different brands. We will assume that the
search is ordered, so physicians decide which object to inspect next (i.e. the order of search
is not random). Most importantly, our model should reflect that it is easier to search some
products than others. For example, products that are further down the list (i.e. which
have higher alphabetical rank) may be harder to find, and branded products may be easier
to find than generic due to brand recognition. We therefore let the search cost location
parameter depend on a vector of consumer and product characteristics µi j = µ(xi j) where in
xi j we include product characteristics like rank and a dummy for the product being generic
as well as consumer characteristics such a gender, age and income. Prior to searching,
physicians hold (degenerate) price expectations pE on which their search decisions are
based. The distribution of the unobserved utility component εi j, Fε , is known before search.
We use Fui j(·|p) to represent the cdf of ui j for a given set of prices, p ∈R
J
+, and f
u
i j(·|p) the
corresponding pdf.
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5.1.2 Solution of dynamic search problem
The ordered search problem of the physician has the same structure as in Weitzman (1979)
and can therefore be solved using “Pandora’s rule,” which provides an index rule for op-
timal search in the dynamic problem. Following Moraga-Gonzalez et al. (2018), we now
explain how the solution implies that our structural model can be estimated with a simple
logit procedure. To introduce the algorithm, suppose that the best product that a physician
has already searched has value u. The marginal gain from searching product j then writes
E
(
max{ui j,u}
)
−u− ci j = Eε
(
max{ωi j(p
E)+ ε −u,0}
)
− ci j (5.1)
≡ Hi j(u)− ci j.
For each product and individual, we can then define the reservation value, ri j, as the solution
to the equation
Hi j(ri j) = ci j.
Note that if the distribution of physician utility, f (εi j), has positive support everywhere on
[0;∞), and is continuous, then H(u) is strictly decreasing. Hence, there is a one-to-one
mapping between ci j and ri j, so that the inverse
ri j = H
−1
i j (ci j). (5.2)
is well-defined. Pandora’s rule for optimal search is to first open the product with highest
reservation value, then the product with second highest and so on. When no product has a
reservation value higher than the highest observed utility, the search stops and the physi-
cian picks the product with highest utility among the searched products. The reservation
price is decreasing in ci j, so if physicians for instance expect all firms to charge identical
prices, then they will open first the product with lowest search cost, which in our model on
average means the first-ranked firm. So in our model, alphabetically ordered search arises
endogenously when the search cost is lowest for the first-ranked products: so long as the
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physician does not expect value to be greatly declining in rank, she will conserve search
effort and start by inspecting the first few products and stop once she expects too small
rewards for continued search.
“Pandora’s Rule” is attractive because it avoids solving a potentially high dimensional
dynamic programming problem with backwards induction. However, as shown in Choi
et al. (2018b); Armstrong (2017) the problem can be simplified even further, because it can
be cast as a discrete choice problem. To do this, one “opens all the boxes” and computes
for each product the index
wi j = min
{
ri j,ui j
}
(5.3)
A physician that chooses argmax j wi j will choose the same product as a physician who
searches according to Pandora’s Rule. The prescription share of product j, sprescj , therefore
equals the share of transactions for which wi j were larger than the corresponding index for
all alternative products,
Pr( j prescribed) = Pr
(
wi j > maxk 6= jwik
)
Equation (5.3) shows that a search model implies a discrete choice model. Using the fact
that the reservation value distribution is directly linked to the search cost in the following
way
Fri j(r) = Pr
[
H−1i j (ci j)≤ r
]
= Pr
[
ci j ≥ Hi j(r)
]
= 1−Pr
[
ci j ≤ Hi j(r)
]
= 1−Fci j
[
Hi j(r)
]
The distribution of w, Fwi j , can then be written in terms of the search cost distribution and
the match value distribution
Fwi j (x) = 1−
[
1−Fri j(x)
][
1−Fui j(x)
]
(5.4)
= 1−Fci j [H(x)]
[
1−Fui j(x)
]
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Computing prescription probabilities involves solving a J − 1 dimensional integral, but
using the relationship in (5.4), this may be done straightforwardly using e.g. simulation
techniques.
However, the key contribution by Moraga-Gonzalez et al. (2018) was to show that suf-
ficient structure has already been assumed to make estimation even more convenient. Note
that Equation (5.4) implies that given a distribution for the unobserved match values Fui j,
there is a one-to-one relationship between the distribution of Fwi j and F
c
i j. So instead of
making parametric assumptions on Fci j and deriving the implications for choice probabil-
ities and requiring simulation during estimation, we may instead make our (convenient)
assumptions on Fwi j and derive the implied distribution of search costs, F
c
i j. Thus, it is
clearly convenient to assume that Fwi j is T1EV with location parameter µi j, implying that
the prescription choice probabilities take the form
Pr( j prescribed) =
exp
[
ωi j(p)−µi j
]
∑
J
k=1 exp
[
ωi j(p)−µik
] , (5.5)
where we have made the assumption that physician price expectations are correct so pE =
p. Moraga-Gonzalez et al. (2018) show that under the assumption on Fwi j , the corresponding
distribution of search cost is
Fci j(c) =
1− exp
{
−exp
[
−H−1i j (c)−µi j
]}
1− exp
{
−exp
[
−H−1i j (c)
]} , (5.6)
from which it is clear that µi j is also a location-shifter for the search cost distribution.
This means that the estimation of the structural ordered search model is done simply by
estimating a conditional logit that additively includes both mean utility shifters (such as
product price), and search cost shifters (such as alphabetical rank). Due to the simplicity
and flexibility of this procedure, we use it as our main specification.
The term ωi j(p) reflects the physician’s perception of how her choice affects consumer
utility. We investigate two different specifications of ωi j(p). In the first one, we let physi-
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cians take into account the substitution at the pharmacy. To do so, we set ωi j(p) equal to
the (log of) expected consumer expenditure when product j is prescribed, computed from
a consumer search model, which we will cover in the subsequent section. This model takes
into account the generic substitution by the pharmacist, which implies that the variation
in expected expenditures is much smaller than the variation in prices, since an expensive
prescription is likely undone at the pharmacist’s recommendation.
Our second specification simply sets ωi j(p) = −ω log(p j), so that physicians search
directly for price. Since price is highly salient to the physician, it may be that physicians do
not solve the complicated consumer-pharmacist decision problem, but rather conserve on
mental effort and focus on what is immediately in front of them. Finally, we parameterize
the location shifter for the search cost distribution for physicians as
µi j = β0ϕ(R j)+β11{ j generic}+ z
′
iβ
u ×ϕ(R j)
where ϕ(·) is a function that maps rank into search cost, and zi denotes a vector of char-
acteristics of the consumer. We will consider both a linear, logarithmic, and fully unre-
stricted functional form, setting respectively ϕ(R j) = R j, ϕ(R j) = log(R j) or ϕ(R j) =
∑
J
r=1 δr1{R j = r}. The coefficient β1 measures the difference in search cost between
generic or branded products. The vector zi includes gender, income and age which we
interact with the product rank to measure how the physician search effort is affected by
consumer characteristics.
5.2 The Consumer Choice
We model consumer choice using an ordered search model as well, but one where the pre-
scription and pharmacy recommendations is what creates prominence (through low search
costs) rather than the alphabetical ordering. Consumer i enters the pharmacy with a pre-
scription and searches among the products that she can legally buy with her prescription.
Since we do not consider repeat purchases, i may also interchangeably refer to a transac-
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tion. Consumers maximize utility
vi j = β
ν
1 log(p j)+ εi j. (5.7)
To learn the values of product j (p j and εi j), consumer i pays the random search cost
ζi j ∼ F
ζ
i j , where the distribution F
ζ
i j has location shifter κi j. It is cheaper to search a product
if it is on the prescription, and it is also cheaper to search the product that the pharmacist is
legally obliged to recommend to the consumer, so we set
κi j = κ j(p,ai)
= β ν2 1p j∈A (p)+β
ν
3 1p j∈B(p)+1ai= j
(
β ν4 1p j∈A (p)+β
ν
5 1p j∈B(p)+β
ν
6 1p j∈C (p)
)
.
where a j indicates whether product j is on the prescription or not, and A (p),B(p),C (p)
define the three price regions described in Section 2.1, which determine whether or not the
pharmacist is legally obliged to recommend substitution:
A (p) = {p}, B(p) = (p;1.05p], C (p) = (1.05p;∞),
where p ≡ mink pk is the lowest price in the market. We can separate consumer prefer-
ences from pharmacy recommendation by assuming that pharmacy recommendations only
depend on which of the three discrete price regions the price is in, and thus discontinuous
changes in demand around these price regions are solely attributed to pharmacy recommen-
dations whereas continuous demand responses within a price region (e.g. the difference in
demand between a cheap and expensive C product) are driven by consumer preferences.
Since pharmacists are obliged to recommend substitution if p j ∈ C (p) but only encour-
aged when p j ∈ B(p), we allow for different effects of these, both in terms of the “recom-
mendation” and “prescription” factors: β ν2 ,β
ν
3 capture the recommendation effects from
the pharmacist suggesting substitution towards a cheaper alternative. Specifically, β ν2 will
help produce the discontinuous change in demand at the minimum price, which we see so
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clearly in the data. Conversely, β ν4 ,β
ν
5 ,β
ν
6 are the prescription effects, which can explain
the status quo bias towards the prescribed product, which is prominent to the consumer
and thus easily searched. Note that our specification implies that κi j is affected by mink pk
(though generic substitution), so search costs are affected by prices of competing products
through the pharmacist’s recommendation. Finally, we do not model the public insurance
system, which is fortunately structured in a way that makes this very nearly without loss of
generality.8
Again, we follow Moraga-Gonzalez et al. (2018) and assume that the unobserved “Pan-
dora’s Rule” utility indices are distributed Extreme Value Type 1, so that the final consump-
tion choice probabilities are
Pr( j purchased|ai) =
exp
[
β v1 log(p j)−κi j
]
∑
J
k=1 exp
[
β v1 log(pk)−κik
] , (5.8)
and simultaneously implying that the consumer search cost distribution takes the form
F
ζ
i j (ζ )=
1−exp{−exp[−H−1i j (ζ )−κi j]}
1−exp{−exp[−H−1i j (ζ )]}
. The expected patient expenditures induced by the physi-
cian’s prescription can now be computed as
E(p|ai) =
J
∑
j=1
exp
[
β v1 log(p j)−κi j
]
∑
J
k=1 exp
[
β v1 log(pk)−κik
] p j. (5.9)
This is the measure we insert as physician preferences in one of the two specifications
we use: ωi j(p) = −ω log(E(p|ai)). Since consumer utility depends only on price the
difference between using expected expenditure and expected utility is whether we scale
prices by the consumer marginal utility of money β v1 . By not doing that we can compare
directly how sensitive physicians are to patient expenses relative to patients themselves.
8In reality, the co-insurance rate is based on the cheapest product within a market, with the patient having
to pay any excess above the minimum price, p. Thus, it is as if patients have to pay τi p regardless of the
product they choose, where τi is out-of-pocked fraction for consumer i. Then the final out-of-pocket payment
is p̃ j = p j − p+τi p, and it is as if we subtract β ν1 (1−τi)p from all utilities. However, since we use log prices
rather than prices in levels, this does not hold exactly.
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5.3 Estimation and Identification
Let i denote a transaction with prescription ai and final patient choice ji. Then the likeli-
hood function for observation i is
Li(θ) = Pr(ai prescribed)Pr( ji chosen|ai)
=
exp [ωiai(pi)−µiai ]
∑
J
k=1 exp [ωik(pi)−µik]
exp
[
β v1 log(pi ji)−κi ji
]
∑
J
k=1 exp
[
β v1 log(pik)−κik
]
with the corresponding choice probabilities given in (5.5) and (5.8). Note that the J-vector
of prices, pi, varies across transactions depending on the date of purchase and the market,
something we have suppressed in the notation previously. Under the assumptions we have
made thus far, the likelihood function can be maximized by first estimating the consumer-
pharmacist choice parameters in ν , and then inserting these in the physician utility function
and estimating the physician search model. The key assumption allowing us to do this is
that the physician cannot condition a j on the realization of the consumer’s utility, εi j.
Before turning to the results, it is worth briefly considering what type of behavior pro-
duces the identifying variation in the data for the two models. The parameters in the con-
sumer conditional choice model are simply identified by variation across consumers in
prices and prescriptions, both across and within markets or time. For instance, the coeffi-
cients on price regions interacted with the prescription dummy are identified by comparing
consumers entering a pharmacy on the same date but having two different products pre-
scribed: one where the second-cheapest is prescribed and one where a more expensive
product is prescribed. For identification of the price parameters it is handy that the market
mechanism has no pure strategy equilibrium due to the discontinuity stemming from phar-
macy recommendations. We can therefore expect random within-product price variation
stemming from the mixing equilibrium outcome. This means that we are actually able to
study the demand under several random price outcomes.
The parameters of the physician search model is the search cost shifters, µi j which
crucially depends on alphabetical rank, as well as the parameters indexing the physician
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utility post search, ωi j(p) which mainly depends on the price. Identification then comes
from a comparison of how prescription shares depend on alphabetical rank across markets
with different realizations of prices. For instance, if we observe that the prescription shares
do not change much whether the first price is much higher or just a little higher than the
second price, then this indicates that search costs play a larger role relative to ω .
5.4 Results
Consumer model estimates Estimates for the consumer search model are presented in
Table (5.1). The reference category is a product with a C price (most expensive region),
which is not prescribed, and not generic. There is a substantial effect of being prescribed
of 1.61 on latent utility, which is the equivalent of a drop in price of more than a full
log point. In fact, the boost in demand is greater even than the effect of the pharmacist’s
recommendation as measured by the coefficient on the A-price dummy (1.47). Similarly,
we note that the advantage to being a non-generic is 0.22 in utils, which is far smaller
than any of the effects described above. This indicates that the market power of original
manufacturers owes more to prominence and search frictions earned through physician
prescriptions, than it does to brand value and other effects.
Physician model estimates Estimates for the physician model are shown in Table 5.2.
In our preferred specification (Column 1), alphabetical rank affects physician search costs
as ϕ(R j) = log(R j), and physicians are altruistic, ωi j(p) = ω log(E(p|ai)). The resulting
model has three coefficients, which are all statistically significant. As expected, the physi-
cian attaches negative weight to expected patient expenditures, and search costs are higher
for products further down the alphabetical list. Moreover, it is substantially easier to search
non-generics, which is consistent with the fact that branded names are very prominent to
physicians, some of whom have been prescribing for years prior to patent expiration when
the branded was the sole option.
Table 5.2 also shows three other specifications where we change one or both of ϕ(R j)
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Table 5.1: Consumer Choice Model
Model 1
Match value
log(Price) -1.32***
(0.01)
Search costs
1(Price A) 1.47***
(0.00)
1(Price B) 0.89***
(0.01)
1(Prescribed and A) 0.86***
(0.01)
1(Prescribed and B) 1.03***
(0.01)
1(Prescribed and C) 1.61***
(0.01)
1(Generic) -0.22***
(0.00)
Observations 590488
Note: Parameters estimated by maximum likelihood using the consumer choice probabilities in
(5.8). The reference category is a product in the C category (most expensive), which is not on the
prescription. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
to be nonparametric (a full set of dummies), and ωi j(p) to be the price directly, pi j. Al-
lowing rank to enter non-parametrically does not significantly change the coefficient on
expected expense. On the other hand, there is naturally a very large difference between
price and expected expense, owing to the fact that the expected expense varies much less
over alternatives than the product price, because the consumer is not forced to buy what
the physician prescribes. In other words, there is much greater variation in product price
across alternatives than in expected expense.
In the final two columns in Table 5.2 we allow physician search costs to depend on
patient characteristics. We do this by including interactions between the log of alphabetical
rank and log patient income, a gender dummy and and age variable. The results imply that
physicians search more for female and for poor consumers. The effect of age, on the other
hand, is a precisely estimated zero. This heterogeneity in search cost can be interpreted
as the physician rationing search effort across consumers according to some preference
ordering. The fact that poor consumers receive more attention is evidence of pro-social
preferences, while the lack of an effect of age may seem surprising given a prior that the
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Table 5.2: Physician Choice Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
log(Price) -0.01* -0.04*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(Expected Expense) -0.57*** -0.64*** -0.56***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log(Rank) -0.51*** -0.52*** -0.30*** -0.29***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06)
1(Generic) -0.89*** -0.84*** -0.86*** -0.83*** -0.89*** -0.84***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(Rank)*Age -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
log(Rank)*1(Female) 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01)
log(Rank)*log(Income) -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
1(Rank=2) -0.41*** -0.41***
(0.01) (0.01)
1(Rank=3) -0.57*** -0.58***
(0.01) (0.01)
1(Rank=4) -0.86*** -0.86***
(0.01) (0.01)
1(Rank=5) -0.74*** -0.75***
(0.01) (0.01)
1(Rank=6) -0.92*** -0.93***
(0.02) (0.02)
1(Rank=7) -0.98*** -0.98***
(0.02) (0.02)
1(Rank=8) -0.67*** -0.64***
(0.03) (0.03)
Observations 115167 115167 115167 115167 115167 115167
Note: The table presents estimates from the model of the physician’s choice of what brand to
prescribe. The estimator is Maximum Likelihood using choice probabilities from equation (5.5).
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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elderly might have a harder time navigating the system.
Model fit Figure 5.1 shows a comparison of the model prediction of the relationship
between prescription share and rank. As seen in panel (a), the data exhibits a sharp decrease
in prescription share in rank after rank one. In general we see a small bump in market share
in the end of the list, reflecting that branded products are typically either first or last in
the markets we study. Panel (b) shows the corresponding predictions from our preferred
specification. The model is largely able to reproduce the relationship seen between rank
and prescription share seen in the data. In Figure A.2 we show models where the search
cost is linear in rank or with rank dummies respectively, producing very similar fits. The
most notable misfit is the 3rd ranked product in 3-firm markets: here, the data shows a large
upwards tick, which is not reproduced by any model.
Figure 5.1: Model Fit
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(b) G(R) = log(R)
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Implied search cost distribution Using estimates from our three different model specifi-
cations of the relation between search cost and rank, we can use the search cost distribution
in Equation (5.6) to work backwards from our conditional logit estimates to construct es-
timates of the structural search cost distribution that physicians face. We show results for
two different specifications in Figure (5.2), where we have used two different assumptions
for the relationship between rank and the search cost location parameter µ . Both specifica-
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tions imply that µ(1) = 0, so that the location for rank one products is 0. This implies that
the search cost distribution for the first ranked product is degenerate with 100% mass at a
search cost equal to zero. This is a convenient property since it is common to assume that
consumers search one product for free when there is no outside option.
Figure 5.2: Implied Search Cost Distribution
(a) µ(R) = log(R)
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(b) µ(R) non-parametric
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Note: The distributions are computed using Equation (5.6).
6 Counterfactual Simulations
Using our structural estimates we conduct a series of counterfactual simulations to both
investigate the role of search costs in consumer choice and to assess the impact of coun-
terfactual designs of the physician search architecture. To do this, we will explore the
following three counterfactuals:
1. Free physician search: setting µ(R j) = 0 for all j and allowing either a) the full
choiceset, or b) only generics to be prescribed,
2. Price ranking: rank products according to price and allow either a) all products, or
b) only generics to be prescribed,9
9For price ranking, we need to take a stand on how to handle ties. When two firms submit the same price,
we assign each the average of the two ranks in question.
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3. Prescribe cheapest: forcing the physician to always prescribe the cheapest product.
We will both conduct counterfactual simulations in which we keep prices fixed, and where
we allow firms to adjust prices in response to the new demand system.
6.1 Solving for Equilibrium Price
Two features of our model complicates the question of counterfactual equilibrium prices:
first, the demand model has a strong discontinuity at the minimum price – implied by
the A-region dummy in Table 5.1. This discontinuity together with a non-zero demand at
higher prices eliminates pure strategy equilibria by the same arguments as in Varian (1980).
Second, firms are inherently asymmetric due to their alphabetical rank and the implications
for prescription shares so it does not make sense to restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.
Therefore, we cannot solve the pricing equilibrium analytically but rely on a numerical
algorithm to solve for the static mixed strategy equilibrium. We discretize the price space
and compute equilibrium strategy vectors using the quantal response homotopy method
implemented in Gambit (version 15.1.1). This is an algorithm which iteratively updates
player strategies in a manner that converges to the unique Nash equilibrium if the game
has a unique equilibrium that is locally stable. Firms maximize revenue arising from the
structural demand model, corresponding to an assumption of zero marginal cost.10 The
computational complexity of finding an equilibrium does not allow us to study games with
more than 4 players if we are to use a reasonable grid size. Having a large number of
grid points is important because when there are too few, the algorithm can only find pure
strategy equilibria.
10Naturally, this is an approximation. However, pharmaceutical products are characterized by high fixed
and low variable costs. Moreover, the price differences across firms of different alphabetical rank that we
documented earlier are consistent with market power rather than differences in marginal cost.
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6.2 Counterfactual simulations with fixed prices
The results are shown in Table 6.1 and are all normalized relative to the equilibrium in the
baseline. Row 1a shows that the direct cost-savings from removing search frictions holding
prices fixed are numerically small, even displaying a tiny increase of 0.1%. This is partly
due to the relative importance of price vis-a-vis idiosyncratic match value in physician
search, and partly due to the fixed prices, which will become more clear once we also
solve for equilibrium prices. Comparing 1a to 1b shows that if we in addition prohibit
non-generic prescriptions, the effect is a cost reduction of 3.2% relative to baseline. This
larger effect reflects the fact that a prescription is most valuable to a product with a price far
above the minimum and non-generics tend to keep their prices high after patent expiration.
In the second counterfactual we explore price ranking of products. When we simply
assume that products are ranked according to price (row 2a), the cost savings are 1.7%
relative to baseline. If we additionally prohibit physicians from writing branded products
on the prescription (row 2b), the average cost savings amount to 4.4% relative to baseline.
This once again shows the importance of physician prescribing in driving costs related to
patients’ continued purchase of high-priced branded products even after patent expiration.
Finally and as expected, the third counterfactual results in a substantial reduction in
cost, since the status quo is then always the cheapest. Forcing the physician to prescribe
the cheapest product results in a reduction in average cost of of 9.4%, holding prices fixed.
However, such a dramatic change is unrealistic in practice as the physician may have in
some cases have medical reasons behind prescription choices such as allergies, captured
by the idiosyncratic match values in our model. Thus, this counterfactual should just be
viewed as an upper bound on the cost savings that can be attained from altering physician
choice.
35
Table 6.1: Counterfactual Simulations: Holding Prices Fixed
2 Firms 3 Firms 4 Firms 5 Firms 6 Firms 7 Firms 8 Firms Total
Baseline (Index) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1a: Free search 99.9 99.9 100.1 100.2 100.1 100.4 100.4 100.2
2a: Price Ranking 99.6 99.1 98.5 98.2 97.8 97.9 97.7 98.3
3: Prescribe Cheapest 98.2 94.8 91.4 89.4 88.5 87.9 86.4 90.4
Prohibiting prescriptions of branded products
1b: Free search 99.9 97.1 96.3 96.0 96.8 97.1 97.2 96.8
2b: Price ranking 99.6 96.7 95.5 94.7 95.2 95.3 95.1 95.6
Note: The table presents normalized average consumer expenses under Five different model
assumptions for physician search. In this counterfactual exercise, we hold the prices fixed at the
observed values. Each column uses only observations from markets with the corresponding number of
active firms, and the column “Total” is a pooled average.
6.3 Counterfactual simulations with equilibrium prices
We now turn to counterfactuals in which we solve for the counterfactual price equilibrium.
Throughout this, we ignore brands and instead assume that all products in the market are
generic. We do this because branded products often price several times above generic
products at a level that is unlikely to be fully understood using the estimated demand system
for the Danish market. Instead, the pricing of branded firms likely reflects an intention to
affect international reference prices which is beyond the scope of this paper.11
Table 6.2 presents average prices by rank and total expenditures for our three counter-
factuals. The results labeled “baseline” show the implied model prices and expenditures
when we solve for the mixed strategy equilibrium using the baseline estimated model. Ta-
ble 6.2 shows that the model-implied equilibrium prices are (weakly) decreasing in rank,
which is consistent with the empirical relation that we documented in Section 4. Fur-
thermore, the magnitudes are relatively close to our preferred fixed effects estimates from
Section 4, in the range of 2% to 6% per rank position.
In the first counterfactual, we see that removing physician search frictions has an am-
11Reference pricing is when a country determines the price of pharmaceuticals based on a basket of other
countries. Denmark is a reference country in many other markets, which may incentivize original manufac-
turers to keep Danish prices high post patent expiration regardless of local market conditions.
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biguous effect on equilibrium prices. In this counterfactual equilibrium, firms are sym-
metric and, reassuringly, we find a symmetric equilibrium. In two-firm markets, prices
are lower for both firms, but with three or four firms, the unique price is higher for the
last-ranked firms. As a result, expenditures decrease the most in two-firm markets.
In the second counterfactual with price ranking, the downwards pressure on prices is
stronger than under free search because the lowest-priced firm wins a lot of prescriptions,
which is a competitive advantage. This implies cost-reductions of just over 5%, 6%, and
4% for markets with two, three and four firms respectively. This result implies that the
effect of changing the IT ranking from name-based to price-based is more effective than
removing search frictions altogether. We see that compared to our counterfactual with
frozen prices, the savings in 2 and 3 firm markets are larger after price adjustments while
they are slightly smaller in 4 firm markets.
The third and final counterfactual removes physician choice altogether, always assign-
ing the cheapest product on the prescription. Again, this makes firms symmetric and the
algorithm converges to a symmetric price equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, this counterfactual
results in the largest cost savings, amounting to 10%, 7% and 7% for markets with two,
three and four firms, respectively. These numbers may be thought of as an upper bound on
how much demand can be directed towards the cheapest product because physicians some-
times do have medical reasoning behind their prescription decisions, e.g. when a particular
patient is allergic to one but not another product.
However, the symmetric equilibrium in the third counterfactual reveals another inter-
esting insight: Expected prices and expenditures are both increasing in competition. This
is a striking contrast to the fact that when we hold market structure fixed, expenditures are
decreasing from counterfactual 1 to 2 to 3, i.e. in the prominence of the cheapest prod-
uct. While seemingly at odds with many standard economic models of competition, this
can occur in theoretical search models, e.g. Janssen and Moraga-González (2004). Intu-
itively, when the competition for the searching segment of consumers becomes too intense,
firms can instead choose to exploit the inelastic non-searching consumers they encounter.
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If a firm is not prominent, it will likely only encounter desperate and thus inelastic con-
sumers. In other words, when firms are faced with a tradeoff between business stealing and
exploitation, the effect of competition can be ambiguous.
Table 6.2: Counterfactuals: Prices in Equilibrium
Prices
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Expenditures
2 Firms Baseline 1.17 1.15 1.16
1a: Free Search 1.14 1.14 1.14
2a: Price Ranking 1.11 1.11 1.10
3: Prescribe Cheapest 1.05 1.05 1.04
3 Firms Baseline 1.20 1.12 1.11 1.13
1a: Free Search 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.13
2a: Price Ranking 1.10 1.10 1.1 1.08
3: Prescribe Cheapest 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.05
4 Firms Baseline 1.20 1.20 1.11 1.1 1.14
1a: Free Search 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.13
2a: Price Ranking 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.09
3: Prescribe Cheapest 1.10 1.10 1.1 1.1 1.06
Note: The table presents average prices and expenditures across rank and under different market
structures. To compute the equilibria we discretize the price grid and compute the equilibrium
using Gambit (version 15). We use the homotopy method using the logit correspondance.
7 Conclusion
We estimate the effect of product prominence on market shares and prices in pharmaceu-
tical markets. Prominence arises from the ease with which physician may find products
on their computer, which clearly affects the likelihood that a product ends up on the pre-
scription. We show that prescribing a product has a strong effect on patient purchasing
behavior and ultimately prices, highlighting the importance of the physician for pharma-
ceutical demand. While it may seem surprising that physician prescriptions affect demand
so heavily, inattention by the consumer could be rational given that an expert has already
made a recommendation in the form of the prescription.
Our structural model shows that putting the cheapest product on the prescription would
save up to 10% in expenses. Given that the system already has strong generic substitution in
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place at the pharmacy, savings of this magnitude are important. It is particularly interesting
that the savings from this improvement in the information architecture are larger than those
arising from a removal of information frictions. Our results highlight that a fully effective
generic substitution ought to start already at the prescribing physician in order to gain
maximum effect.
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Appendix Intended for Online
Publication
A Appendix
Table A.1: Sample Selection
Selection Product-Periods Transactions
Raw Data 3,162,223 869,804,625
A: After 2005 1,776,331 501,049,110
B: A & Off Patent 1,066,805 364,806,655
C: B & 2 ≤ J ≤ 8 749,072 245,345,025
D: C & package name observed 704,731 218,958,275
E: D & market share not missing 697,636 218,958,040
F: E & max. 2 branded 348,494 99,491,700
G: F & year ≤ 2013 207,918 60,136,270
H: G & age, gender & inc observed 172,502 60,080,895
Note: The sample “F” is our product-level panel, used in Section 4, and “H” is our transaction-level
sample used in Section 5. The selection to periods prior to 2014 (“G”) is income is not in our data
after 2013.
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Figure A.1: Out of pocket payment under the public health insurance
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Note: The plot depicts the fraction of the transaction price that must be paid out of pocket by the
consumer. The spending thresholds are as of 2015 and subject to an annual inflation adjustments.
Each consumer will have asynchronous drug expenditures years: the first time a consumer makes
a purchase, an expenditure year is initiated. During the year, expenditures mount and the marginal
payment starts to fall. Then, precisely a year later, total expenditures are reset to zero. The next year
does not begin until the next time the consumer makes a purchase.
A.1 Log Revenue
Table A.2: Log (revenue+1) regressions: linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Alphabetical Rank 0.285∗∗ 0.167 0.0434 0.109 0.0679
(0.0884) (0.0874) (0.0521) (0.0665) (0.0552)
Alphabetical Rank×No. Firms -0.0754∗∗∗ -0.0503∗∗∗ -0.0267∗∗ -0.0426∗∗∗ -0.0310∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0148) (0.00906) (0.00966) (0.00958)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 1552 1552 1547 1540 1475
Observations 697636 697635 697630 697511 685368
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.2 Regressions using broader generic definition
Table A.3: Prescription share: wide definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0689∗∗∗ -0.0714∗∗∗ -0.0775∗∗∗ -0.0951∗∗∗ -0.0786∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.00892) (0.00901) (0.00758) (0.00919)
Rank×No. Firms 0.00521∗∗ 0.00725∗∗∗ 0.00835∗∗∗ 0.00990∗∗∗ 0.00866∗∗∗
(0.00181) (0.00126) (0.00125) (0.000942) (0.00127)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level. We use a broader definition of generic, that is a product
that have quotes in the name or satisfies that the product was first observed after the patent expired. We use
markets where no more than 2 or 50 percent of products are non-generic according to this definition. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A.4: Market share: wide definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0212∗∗ -0.0234∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0139∗ -0.0246∗∗∗
(0.00793) (0.00595) (0.00599) (0.00670) (0.00608)
Rank×No. Firms 0.00186 0.00223∗ 0.00248∗∗ 0.0000665 0.00255∗∗
(0.00118) (0.000886) (0.000885) (0.000876) (0.000892)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level. We use a broader definition of generic, that is a product
that have quotes in the name or satisfies that the product was first observed after the patent expired. We use
markets where no more than 2 or 50 percent of products are non-generic according to this definition. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, *** p<0.001
44
Table A.5: Revenue share: wide definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0197∗∗ -0.0255∗∗∗ -0.0289∗∗∗ -0.0107 -0.0301∗∗∗
(0.00760) (0.00629) (0.00645) (0.00660) (0.00658)
Rank×No. Firms 0.00145 0.00240∗ 0.00293∗∗ 0.0000307 0.00309∗∗
(0.00118) (0.000953) (0.000950) (0.000914) (0.000957)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level. We use a broader definition of generic, that is a product
that have quotes in the name or satisfies that the product was first observed after the patent expired. We use
markets where no more than 2 or 50 percent of products are non-generic according to this definition. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A.6: Log revenue: wide definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank 0.000334 -0.00785 -0.0361 -0.0364 -0.0368
(0.0265) (0.0255) (0.0222) (0.0260) (0.0227)
Rank×No. Firms -0.00760 -0.00511 -0.00126 -0.00125 -0.00106
(0.00478) (0.00392) (0.00373) (0.00321) (0.00380)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level. We use a broader definition of generic, that is a product
that have quotes in the name or satisfies that the product was first observed after the patent expired. We use
markets where no more than 2 or 50 percent of products are non-generic according to this definition. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.7: Log price: wide definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0377 -0.0674∗ -0.0574∗∗ -0.0415∗ -0.0613∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0262) (0.0185) (0.0210) (0.0187)
Rank×No. Firms 0.00646 0.00841∗ 0.00725∗ 0.00692∗∗ 0.00802∗∗
(0.00542) (0.00402) (0.00299) (0.00236) (0.00298)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level. We use a broader definition of generic, that is a product
that have quotes in the name or satisfies that the product was first observed after the patent expired. We use
markets where no more than 2 or 50 percent of products are non-generic according to this definition. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, *** p<0.001
A.3 Regressions using narrow generic definition
Table A.8: Prescription share: narrow definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0689∗∗∗ -0.0714∗∗∗ -0.0775∗∗∗ -0.0951∗∗∗ -0.0786∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.00892) (0.00901) (0.00758) (0.00919)
Rank × No. Firms 0.00521∗∗ 0.00725∗∗∗ 0.00835∗∗∗ 0.00990∗∗∗ 0.00866∗∗∗
(0.00181) (0.00126) (0.00125) (0.000942) (0.00127)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level. We define a generic narrowly as a product with quotes
in the name and use markets where no more than 2 or 50 percent of products are non-generic. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.9: Market share: narrow definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0212∗∗ -0.0234∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0139∗ -0.0246∗∗∗
(0.00793) (0.00595) (0.00599) (0.00670) (0.00608)
Rank × No. Firms 0.00186 0.00223∗ 0.00248∗∗ 0.0000665 0.00255∗∗
(0.00118) (0.000886) (0.000885) (0.000876) (0.000892)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level. We define a generic narrowly as a product with quotes
in the name and use markets where no more than 2 or 50 percent of products are non-generic. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A.10: Log price: narrow definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0377 -0.0674∗ -0.0574∗∗ -0.0415∗ -0.0613∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0262) (0.0185) (0.0210) (0.0187)
Rank × No. Firms 0.00646 0.00841∗ 0.00725∗ 0.00692∗∗ 0.00802∗∗
(0.00542) (0.00402) (0.00299) (0.00236) (0.00298)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level. We define a generic narrowly as a product with quotes
in the name and use markets where no more than 2 or 50 percent of products are non-generic. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.11: Revenue share: narrow definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank -0.0197∗∗ -0.0255∗∗∗ -0.0289∗∗∗ -0.0107 -0.0301∗∗∗
(0.00760) (0.00629) (0.00645) (0.00660) (0.00658)
Rank × No. Firms 0.00145 0.00240∗ 0.00293∗∗ 0.0000307 0.00309∗∗
(0.00118) (0.000953) (0.000950) (0.000914) (0.000957)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Table A.12: Log revenue: narrow definition of generics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Company FE Market+Company FE Product FE Market-by-date FE
Rank 0.000334 -0.00785 -0.0361 -0.0364 -0.0368
(0.0265) (0.0255) (0.0222) (0.0260) (0.0227)
Rank × No. Firms -0.00760 -0.00511 -0.00126 -0.00125 -0.00106
(0.00478) (0.00392) (0.00373) (0.00321) (0.00380)
Drug age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Period FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Market FE No No Yes No No
Product FE No No No Yes No
Market-by-date FE No No No No Yes
Clusters 711 711 711 700 711
Observations 348494 348491 348491 348354 348491
Note: Standard errors clustered at the market level. We define a generic narrowly as a product with quotes
in the name and use markets where no more than 2 or 50 percent of products are non-generic. *p<0.05,
**p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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A.4 Model Fit: Linear and Non-Parametric Specifications
Figure A.2: Model Fit
(a) G(R) = R
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(b) G(R) non parametric
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Firm rank
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Pr
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
sh
ar
e
2 firms
3 firms
4 firms
5 firms
6 firms
7 firms
8 firms
49
A.5 Structural Model Simulations
Table A.13: Equilibrium Expected Profit and Counterfactuals
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Total
2 Firms Baseline 0.09 0.07 0.16
Counterfactual: Free Search 0.07 0.07 0.14
Counterfactual: Price Ranking 0.05 0.05 0.10
Counterfactual: Prescribe Cheapest 0.02 0.02 0.04
3 Firms Baseline 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.13
Counterfactual: Free Search 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.13
Counterfactual: Price Ranking 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08
Counterfactual: Prescribe Cheapest 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05
4 Firms Baseline 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.14
Counterfactual: Free Search 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.13
Counterfactual: Price Ranking 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.09
Counterfactual: Prescribe Cheapest 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06
Note: The tables present average revenue across rank and under different market structure using
equilibrium price distributions. To compute the equilibria we discretize the price grid and
compute the equilibrium using Gambit (version 15). We use the homotopy method using the logit
correspondance.
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A.6 Generic Status by Rank
Figure A.3: Generic share (Wide definition) by rank
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Note: The figure is constructed using our product-level dataset (i.e. an observation is a product-period)
including all products both branded and generic. Note that there can be multiple branded in a given market,
although there is most typically only one.
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